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author | klondike <klondike@xiscosoft.es> | 2012-04-02 17:49:09 +0200 |
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committer | klondike <klondike@xiscosoft.es> | 2012-04-02 17:49:09 +0200 |
commit | 036119a286cf69f29a0aad81ee98d5f1128cdf1f (patch) | |
tree | 4b7a6daf32a2f912bd61d02113a8945370a40475 | |
parent | Backport change to project directory (diff) | |
download | hardened-docs-036119a286cf69f29a0aad81ee98d5f1128cdf1f.tar.gz hardened-docs-036119a286cf69f29a0aad81ee98d5f1128cdf1f.tar.bz2 hardened-docs-036119a286cf69f29a0aad81ee98d5f1128cdf1f.zip |
WIP on the revdep-pax guide
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diff --git a/xml/revdep-pax.xml b/xml/revdep-pax.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba9f822 --- /dev/null +++ b/xml/revdep-pax.xml @@ -0,0 +1,740 @@ +<?xml version='1.0' encoding="UTF-8"?> +<!DOCTYPE guide SYSTEM "/dtd/guide.dtd"> +<!-- $Header: $ --> + +<guide> +<title>Gentoo revdep-pax introduction</title> + +<author title="Author"> + <mail link="klondike"/> +</author> + +<abstract> +This guide provides an introduction to revdep-pax and how to use it to propagate +the PaC markings caused by libraries requiring them, for example, libraries +requiring RWX memory in order to process JIT code. +</abstract> + +<!-- The content of this document is licensed under the CC-BY-SA license --> +<!-- See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5 --> +<license/> + +<version>1</version> +<date>2012-02-19</date> + +<chapter> +<title>What's <c>revdep-pax</c> about?</title> + +<p by="Geroge Orwell"> +Since the early days of PaX it was known that all programs were equal although +some were more equal than others and needed an environment with less +restrictions in order to be able to run. Thus, in order to have a secure way of +allowing system administrators and users telling the system which binaries +needed this lessened environment the PaX marks were created. +</p> + +<section> +<title>A quick introduction to PaX markings.</title> +<body> + +<p> +There are some programs which won't be able to run in an environment with all +the PaX features enabled, for example you may have a program which has so called +<e>text relocations</e> or you may have a language interpreter doing JIT code +compilation and requiring <e>RWX</e> mappings you may also have a program that +saves data including internal pointers into an mmaped file and which needs to be +restored in the same place no matter what. You could also be holding a security +competition and need to disable the execution restrictions and force it to +use fixed addresses on a particular program so it can be exploited doing a +simple nop sled based stack overflow to get to the next level. For taking into +account these issues binaries can be marked to force on or off some of the PaX +features. +</p> + +<p> +Currently, the PaX features that can be lessened or enforced to allow programs +to run are: +</p> + +<dl> + <dt><b>PAGEEXEC</b></dt> + <dd>Paging based execution restrictions. This is what other OSes know as + <e>NX</e>.</dd> + <dt><b>EMUTRAMP</b></dt> + <dd>Trampoline emulation. Required by for amongst other things code with + nested functions.</dd> + <dt><b>MPROTECT</b></dt> + <dd>Prevents the introduction of new executable code in the task. This is the + one you are more likely to need disabling with libraries generating JIT code. + </dd> + <dt><b>RANDMMAP</b></dt> + <dd>Randomizes the addresses where mappings are made unless the program + explicitly requests one (using the MAP_FIXED flag).</dd> + <dt><b>RANDEXEC</b></dt> + <dd>This flag is currently deprecated and was used to enforce random placement + of the executable part of the binary.</dd> + <dt><b>SEGMEXEC</b></dt> + <dd>This flag enables segmentation based execution protection. This feature is + not available on the amd64 architecture so in that architecture is disables by + default.</dd> +</dl> + +<p> +There are various ways in which this advice to lessen the environment can be +provided to the system, amongst others Mandatory Access Control rules, extended +attributes and two kinds of markings on the binaries themselves, the legacy ones +which abuse an unused field in the ELF headers and the new ones which add a new +specific section to the ELF file with the markings. +</p> + +<p> +All this markings though are only read in the executable and not in the +libraries linked by it to prevent some possible attacks (like libraries being +injected via LD_PRELOAD) and because it eases a lot the implementation since the +kernel shouldn't be aware of linking details. +</p> + +<p> +This system has a problem: if we have a binary linking to a library which +requires, for example, trampoline emulation because it uses nested functions how +can we make sure the binary gets the propper markings? Yeah we could add PaX +marks to the library to state it needs trampoline emulation but still we haven't +fixed the issue since the kernel will only read the marks on the binary being +called. In order to solve this issue we have created <c>revdep-pax</c>. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>What's <c>revdep-pax</c>?</title> +<body> + +<p> +<c>revdep-pax</c> is a tool that allows to check for differences in PaX markings +between elf objects linking to libraries (for example <path>/bin/bash</path>) +and the libraries themselves (for example <path>/lib64/libc.so.6</path>). +</p> + +<p> +<c>revdep-pax</c> is able to do this in various ways, it can check for +differences <e>forward</e> from one binary to all the libraries it links and it +can also check for PaX marking differences <e>backwards</e> from one library to +all the binaries linking to it (which may include other libraries too). In a +similar way it is possible to have all the forward and reverse mappings in the +system checked to try finding issues. +</p> + +<p> +<c>revdep-pax</c> is also able to propagate these markings both forward to the +libraries linked by an object and backwards to the objects linked by a library. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter> +<title>Using <c>revdep-pax</c></title> + +<p by="The Emperor"> +In order to witness the firepower of this fully ARMED and OPERATIONAL tool +you'll first need to learn how to use it, once you are done, you'll be +able to fire at will. +</p> + +<section> +<title>Propagating PaX marks backwards from a library to objects that link at it +</title> +<body> + +<p> +This is going to be probably the main way in which you are going to use this +utility. What it does is check all the libraries linked statically +The <c>scanelf</c> application is part of the <c>app-misc/pax-utils</c> package. +With this application you can print out information specific to the ELF +structure of a binary. The following table sums up the various options. +</p> + +<table> +<tr> + <th>Option</th> + <th>Long Option</th> + <th>Description</th> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-p</ti> + <ti>--path</ti> + <ti>Scan all directories in PATH environment</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-l</ti> + <ti>--ldpath</ti> + <ti>Scan all directories in /etc/ld.so.conf</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-R</ti> + <ti>--recursive</ti> + <ti>Scan directories recursively</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-m</ti> + <ti>--mount</ti> + <ti>Don't recursively cross mount points</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-y</ti> + <ti>--symlink</ti> + <ti>Don't scan symlinks</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-A</ti> + <ti>--archives</ti> + <ti>Scan archives (.a files)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-L</ti> + <ti>--ldcache</ti> + <ti>Utilize ld.so.cache information (use with -r/-n)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-X</ti> + <ti>--fix</ti> + <ti>Try and 'fix' bad things (use with -r/-e)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-z [arg]</ti> + <ti>--setpax [arg]</ti> + <ti>Sets EI_PAX/PT_PAX_FLAGS to [arg] (use with -Xx)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <th>Option</th> + <th>Long Option</th> + <th>Description</th> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-x</ti> + <ti>--pax</ti> + <ti>Print PaX markings</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-e</ti> + <ti>--header</ti> + <ti>Print GNU_STACK/PT_LOAD markings</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-t</ti> + <ti>--textrel</ti> + <ti>Print TEXTREL information</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-r</ti> + <ti>--rpath</ti> + <ti>Print RPATH information</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-n</ti> + <ti>--needed</ti> + <ti>Print NEEDED information</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-i</ti> + <ti>--interp</ti> + <ti>Print INTERP information</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-b</ti> + <ti>--bind</ti> + <ti>Print BIND information</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-S</ti> + <ti>--soname</ti> + <ti>Print SONAME information</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-s [arg]</ti> + <ti>--symbol [arg]</ti> + <ti>Find a specified symbol</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-k [arg]</ti> + <ti>--section [arg]</ti> + <ti>Find a specified section</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-N [arg]</ti> + <ti>--lib [arg]</ti> + <ti>Find a specified library</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-g</ti> + <ti>--gmatch</ti> + <ti>Use strncmp to match libraries. (use with -N)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-T</ti> + <ti>--textrels</ti> + <ti>Locate cause of TEXTREL</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-E [arg]</ti> + <ti>--etype [arg]</ti> + <ti>Print only ELF files matching etype ET_DYN,ET_EXEC ...</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-M [arg]</ti> + <ti>--bits [arg]</ti> + <ti>Print only ELF files matching numeric bits</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-a</ti> + <ti>--all</ti> + <ti>Print all scanned info (-x -e -t -r -b)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <th>Option</th> + <th>Long Option</th> + <th>Description</th> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-q</ti> + <ti>--quiet</ti> + <ti>Only output 'bad' things</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-v</ti> + <ti>--verbose</ti> + <ti>Be verbose (can be specified more than once)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-F [arg]</ti> + <ti>--format [arg]</ti> + <ti>Use specified format for output</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-f [arg]</ti> + <ti>--from [arg]</ti> + <ti>Read input stream from a filename</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-o [arg]</ti> + <ti>--file [arg]</ti> + <ti>Write output stream to a filename</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-B</ti> + <ti>--nobanner</ti> + <ti>Don't display the header</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-h</ti> + <ti>--help</ti> + <ti>Print this help and exit</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>-V</ti> + <ti>--version</ti> + <ti>Print version and exit</ti> +</tr> +</table> + +<p> +The format specifiers for the <c>-F</c> option are given in the following table. +Prefix each specifier with <c>%</c> (verbose) or <c>#</c> (silent) accordingly. +</p> + +<table> +<tr> + <th>Specifier</th> + <th>Full Name</th> + <th>Specifier</th> + <th>Full Name</th> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>F</ti> + <ti>Filename</ti> + <ti>x</ti> + <ti>PaX Flags</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>e</ti> + <ti>STACK/RELRO</ti> + <ti>t</ti> + <ti>TEXTREL</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>r</ti> + <ti>RPATH</ti> + <ti>n</ti> + <ti>NEEDED</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>i</ti> + <ti>INTERP</ti> + <ti>b</ti> + <ti>BIND</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>s</ti> + <ti>Symbol</ti> + <ti>N</ti> + <ti>Library</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>o</ti> + <ti>Type</ti> + <ti>p</ti> + <ti>File name</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>f</ti> + <ti>Base file name</ti> + <ti>k</ti> + <ti>Section</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>a</ti> + <ti>ARCH/e_machine</ti> + <ti> </ti> + <ti> </ti> +</tr> +</table> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Using scanelf for Text Relocations</title> +<body> + +<p> +As an example, we will use <c>scanelf</c> to find binaries containing text +relocations. +</p> + +<p> +A relocation is an operation that rewrites an address in a loaded segment. Such +an address rewrite can happen when a segment has references to a shared object +and that shared object is loaded in memory. In this case, the references are +substituted with the real address values. Similar events can occur inside the +shared object itself. +</p> + +<p> +A text relocation is a relocation in the text segment. Since text segments +contain executable code, system administrators might prefer not to have these +segments writable. This is perfectly possible, but since text relocations +actually write in the text segment, it is not always feasible. +</p> + +<p> +If you want to eliminate text relocations, you will need to make sure +that the application and shared object is built with <e>Position Independent +Code</e> (PIC), making references obsolete. This not only increases security, +but also increases the performance in case of shared objects (allowing writes in +the text segment requires a swap space reservation and a private copy of the +shared object for each application that uses it). +</p> + +<p> +The following example will search your library paths recursively, without +leaving the mounted file system and ignoring symbolic links, for any ELF binary +containing a text relocation: +</p> + +<pre caption="Scanning the system for text relocation binaries"> +# <i>scanelf -lqtmyR</i> +</pre> + +<p> +If you want to scan your entire system for <e>any</e> file containing text +relocations: +</p> + +<pre caption="Scanning the entire system for text relocation files"> +# <i>scanelf -qtmyR /</i> +</pre> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Using scanelf for Specific Header</title> +<body> + +<p> +The scanelf util can be used to quickly identify files that contain a +given section header using the -k .section option. +</p> + +<p> +In this example we are looking for all files in /usr/lib/debug +recursively using a format modifier with quiet mode enabled that have been +stripped. A stripped elf will lack a .symtab entry, so we use the '!' +to invert the matching logic. +</p> + +<pre caption="Scanning for stripped or non stripped executables"> +# <i>scanelf -k '!.symtab' /usr/lib/debug -Rq -F%F#k</i> +</pre> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Using scanelf for Specific Segment Markings</title> +<body> + +<p> +Each segment has specific flags assigned to it in the Program Header of the +binary. One of those flags is the type of the segment. Interesting values are +PT_LOAD (the segment must be loaded in memory from file), PT_DYNAMIC (the +segment contains dynamic linking information), PT_INTERP (the segment +contains the name of the program interpreter), PT_GNU_STACK (a GNU extension +for the ELF format, used by some stack protection mechanisms), and PT_PAX_FLAGS +(a PaX extension for the ELF format, used by the security-minded +<uri link="http://pax.grsecurity.net/">PaX Project</uri>. +</p> + +<p> +If we want to scan all executables in the current working directory, PATH +environment and library paths and report those who have a writable and +executable PT_LOAD or PT_GNU_STACK marking, you could use the following command: +</p> + +<pre caption="Scanning for Write/eXecute flags for PT_LOAD and PT_GNU_STACK"> +# <i>scanelf -lpqe .</i> +</pre> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Using scanelf's Format Modifier Handler</title> +<body> + +<p> +A useful feature of the <c>scanelf</c> utility is the format modifier handler. +With this option you can control the output of <c>scanelf</c>, thereby +simplifying parsing the output with scripts. +</p> + +<p> +As an example, we will use <c>scanelf</c> to print the file names that contain +text relocations: +</p> + +<pre caption="Example of the scanelf format modifier handler"> +# <i>scanelf -l -p -R -q -F "%F #t"</i> +</pre> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter id="pspax"> +<title>Listing PaX Flags and Capabilities</title> +<section> +<title>About PaX</title> +<body> + +<p> +<uri link="http://pax.grsecurity.net">PaX</uri> is a project hosted by the <uri +link="http://www.grsecurity.net">grsecurity</uri> project. Quoting the <uri +link="http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/pax.txt">PaX documentation</uri>, its main +goal is "to research various defense mechanisms against the exploitation of +software bugs that give an attacker arbitrary read/write access to the +attacked task's address space. This class of bugs contains among others +various forms of buffer overflow bugs (be they stack or heap based), user +supplied format string bugs, etc." +</p> + +<p> +To be able to benefit from these defense mechanisms, you need to run a Linux +kernel patched with the latest PaX code. The <uri +link="http://hardened.gentoo.org">Hardened Gentoo</uri> project supports PaX and +its parent project, grsecurity. The supported kernel package is +<c>sys-kernel/hardened-sources</c>. +</p> + +<p> +The Gentoo/Hardened project has a <uri +link="/proj/en/hardened/pax-quickstart.xml">Gentoo PaX Quickstart Guide</uri> +for your reading pleasure. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Flags and Capabilities</title> +<body> + +<p> +If your toolchain supports it, your binaries can have additional PaX flags in +their Program Header. The following flags are supported: +</p> + +<table> +<tr> + <th>Flag</th> + <th>Name</th> + <th>Description</th> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>P</ti> + <ti>PAGEEXEC</ti> + <ti> + Refuse code execution on writable pages based on the NX bit + (or emulated NX bit) + </ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>S</ti> + <ti>SEGMEXEC</ti> + <ti> + Refuse code execution on writable pages based on the + segmentation logic of IA-32 + </ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>E</ti> + <ti>EMUTRAMP</ti> + <ti> + Allow known code execution sequences on writable pages that + should not cause any harm + </ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>M</ti> + <ti>MPROTECT</ti> + <ti> + Prevent the creation of new executable code to the process + address space + </ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>R</ti> + <ti>RANDMMAP</ti> + <ti> + Randomize the stack base to prevent certain stack overflow + attacks from being successful + </ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>X</ti> + <ti>RANDEXEC</ti> + <ti> + Randomize the address where the application maps to prevent + certain attacks from being exploitable + </ti> +</tr> +</table> + +<p> +The default Linux kernel also supports certain capabilities, grouped in the +so-called <e>POSIX.1e Capabilities</e>. You can find a listing of those +capabilities in our <uri +link="/proj/en/hardened/capabilities.xml">POSIX Capabilities</uri> document. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +<section> +<title>Using pspax</title> +<body> + +<p> +The <c>pspax</c> application, part of the <c>pax-utils</c> package, displays the +run-time capabilities of all programs you have permission for. On Linux kernels +with additional support for extended attributes (such as SELinux) those +attributes are shown as well. +</p> + +<p> +When ran, <c>pspax</c> shows the following information: +</p> + +<table> +<tr> + <th>Column</th> + <th>Description</th> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>USER</ti> + <ti>Owner of the process</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>PID</ti> + <ti>Process id</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>PAX</ti> + <ti>Run-time PaX flags (if applicable)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>MAPS</ti> + <ti>Write/eXecute markings for the process map</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>ELF_TYPE</ti> + <ti>Process executable type: ET_DYN or ET_EXEC</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>NAME</ti> + <ti>Name of the process</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>CAPS</ti> + <ti>POSIX.1e capabilities (see note)</ti> +</tr> +<tr> + <ti>ATTR</ti> + <ti>Extended attributes (if applicable)</ti> +</tr> +</table> + +<note> +<c>pspax</c> only displays these capabilities when it is linked with +the external capabilities library. This requires you to build <c>pax-utils</c> +with -DWANT_SYSCAP. +</note> + +<p> +By default, <c>pspax</c> does not show any kernel processes. If you want those +to be taken as well, use the <c>-a</c> switch. +</p> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> + +<chapter id="dumpelf"> +<title>Programming with ELF files</title> +<section> +<title>The dumpelf Utility</title> +<body> + +<p> +With the <c>dumpelf</c> utility you can convert a ELF file into human readable C +code that defines a structure with the same image as the original ELF file. +</p> + +<pre caption="dumpelf example"> +$ <i>dumpelf /bin/hostname</i> +#include <elf.h> + +<comment>/* + * ELF dump of '/bin/hostname' + * 10276 (0x2824) bytes + */</comment> + +struct { + Elf32_Ehdr ehdr; + Elf32_Phdr phdrs[8]; + Elf32_Shdr shdrs[26]; +} dumpedelf_0 = { + +.ehdr = { +<comment>(... Output stripped ...)</comment> +</pre> + +</body> +</section> +</chapter> +</guide> |