diff options
author | John Helmert III <ajak@gentoo.org> | 2022-11-04 19:39:58 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> | 2022-11-05 02:06:35 +0000 |
commit | 5eca952121b4f64dc7c40f81338384bf299ee771 (patch) | |
tree | 580893b70c965e438eb9d7d0fa85816da3f507bb /app-admin/sudo | |
parent | media-libs/xine-lib: sync live (diff) | |
download | gentoo-5eca952121b4f64dc7c40f81338384bf299ee771.tar.gz gentoo-5eca952121b4f64dc7c40f81338384bf299ee771.tar.bz2 gentoo-5eca952121b4f64dc7c40f81338384bf299ee771.zip |
app-admin/sudo: patch CVE-2022-43995
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/879209
Signed-off-by: John Helmert III <ajak@gentoo.org>
Closes: https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo/pull/28143
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'app-admin/sudo')
-rw-r--r-- | app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.9.12-CVE-2022-43995.patch | 53 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.9.12-r1.ebuild | 287 |
2 files changed, 340 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.9.12-CVE-2022-43995.patch b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.9.12-CVE-2022-43995.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2601669eecfd --- /dev/null +++ b/app-admin/sudo/files/sudo-1.9.12-CVE-2022-43995.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/879209 +Upstream: https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/bd209b9f16fcd1270c13db27ae3329c677d48050 + +From bd209b9f16fcd1270c13db27ae3329c677d48050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws> +Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 07:29:55 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2022-43995, potential heap overflow for passwords < 8 + characters. Starting with sudo 1.8.0 the plaintext password buffer is + dynamically sized so it is not safe to assume that it is at least 9 bytes in + size. Found by Hugo Lefeuvre (University of Manchester) with ConfFuzz. + +--- + plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c | 11 +++++------ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c b/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c +index b2046eca2..0416861e9 100644 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ sudo_passwd_init(struct passwd *pw, sudo_auth *auth) + int + sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_conv_callback *callback) + { +- char sav, *epass; ++ char des_pass[9], *epass; + char *pw_epasswd = auth->data; + size_t pw_len; + int matched = 0; +@@ -75,12 +75,12 @@ sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_c + + /* + * Truncate to 8 chars if standard DES since not all crypt()'s do this. +- * If this turns out not to be safe we will have to use OS #ifdef's (sigh). + */ +- sav = pass[8]; + pw_len = strlen(pw_epasswd); +- if (pw_len == DESLEN || HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len)) +- pass[8] = '\0'; ++ if (pw_len == DESLEN || HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len)) { ++ strlcpy(des_pass, pass, sizeof(des_pass)); ++ pass = des_pass; ++ } + + /* + * Normal UN*X password check. +@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_c + * only compare the first DESLEN characters in that case. + */ + epass = (char *) crypt(pass, pw_epasswd); +- pass[8] = sav; + if (epass != NULL) { + if (HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len) && strlen(epass) == DESLEN) + matched = !strncmp(pw_epasswd, epass, DESLEN); diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.9.12-r1.ebuild b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.9.12-r1.ebuild new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..04850cee909d --- /dev/null +++ b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.9.12-r1.ebuild @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +# Copyright 1999-2022 Gentoo Authors +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2 + +EAPI=8 + +inherit pam libtool tmpfiles toolchain-funcs + +MY_P="${P/_/}" +MY_P="${MY_P/beta/b}" + +DESCRIPTION="Allows users or groups to run commands as other users" +HOMEPAGE="https://www.sudo.ws/" +if [[ ${PV} == 9999 ]] ; then + inherit mercurial + EHG_REPO_URI="https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo" +else + VERIFY_SIG_OPENPGP_KEY_PATH="${BROOT}"/usr/share/openpgp-keys/sudo.ws.asc + inherit verify-sig + + uri_prefix= + case ${P} in + *_beta*|*_rc*) uri_prefix=beta/ ;; + esac + + SRC_URI="https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz + ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz + verify-sig? ( + https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz.sig + ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz.sig + )" + if [[ ${PV} != *_beta* ]] && [[ ${PV} != *_rc* ]] ; then + KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~loong ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~riscv ~s390 ~sparc ~x86 ~sparc-solaris" + fi + + BDEPEND+="verify-sig? ( sec-keys/openpgp-keys-sudo )" +fi + +# Basic license is ISC-style as-is, some files are released under +# 3-clause BSD license +LICENSE="ISC BSD" +SLOT="0" +IUSE="gcrypt ldap nls offensive pam sasl +secure-path selinux +sendmail skey ssl sssd" + +DEPEND=" + sys-libs/zlib:= + virtual/libcrypt:= + gcrypt? ( dev-libs/libgcrypt:= ) + ldap? ( + >=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1:= + sasl? ( + dev-libs/cyrus-sasl + net-nds/openldap:=[sasl] + ) + ) + pam? ( sys-libs/pam ) + sasl? ( dev-libs/cyrus-sasl ) + selinux? ( sys-libs/libselinux ) + skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1 ) + ssl? ( dev-libs/openssl:0= ) + sssd? ( sys-auth/sssd[sudo] ) +" +RDEPEND=" + ${DEPEND} + >=app-misc/editor-wrapper-3 + virtual/editor + ldap? ( dev-lang/perl ) + pam? ( sys-auth/pambase ) + selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-sudo ) + sendmail? ( virtual/mta ) +" +BDEPEND+=" + sys-devel/bison + virtual/pkgconfig +" + +S="${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}" + +REQUIRED_USE=" + ?? ( pam skey ) + ?? ( gcrypt ssl ) +" + +MAKEOPTS+=" SAMPLES=" + +PATCHES=( + "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-mips-build.patch + "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-CVE-2022-43995.patch +) + +src_prepare() { + default + + elibtoolize +} + +set_secure_path() { + # First extract the default ROOTPATH from build env + SECURE_PATH=$(unset ROOTPATH; . "${EPREFIX}"/etc/profile.env; echo "${ROOTPATH}") + + case "${SECURE_PATH}" in + */usr/sbin*) + ;; + *) + SECURE_PATH=$(unset PATH; . "${EPREFIX}"/etc/profile.env; echo "${PATH}") + ;; + esac + + if [[ -z ${SECURE_PATH} ]] ; then + ewarn " Failed to detect SECURE_PATH, please report this" + fi + + # Then remove duplicate path entries + cleanpath() { + local newpath thisp IFS=: + for thisp in $1 ; do + if [[ :${newpath}: != *:${thisp}:* ]] ; then + newpath+=:${thisp} + else + einfo " Duplicate entry ${thisp} removed..." + fi + done + SECURE_PATH=${newpath#:} + } + cleanpath /usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/opt/bin${SECURE_PATH:+:${SECURE_PATH}} + + # Finally, strip gcc paths, bug #136027 + rmpath() { + local e newpath thisp IFS=: + for thisp in ${SECURE_PATH} ; do + for e ; do + [[ ${thisp} == ${e} ]] && continue 2 ; + done + newpath+=:${thisp} + done + SECURE_PATH=${newpath#:} + } + rmpath '*/gcc-bin/*' '*/gnat-gcc-bin/*' '*/gnat-gcc/*' +} + +src_configure() { + local SECURE_PATH + + set_secure_path + + # bug #767712 + tc-export PKG_CONFIG + + # - audit: somebody got to explain me how I can test this before I + # enable it.. - Diego + # - plugindir: autoconf code is crappy and does not delay evaluation + # until `make` time, so we have to use a full path here rather than + # basing off other values. + local myeconfargs=( + # We set all of the relevant options by ourselves (patched + # into the toolchain) and setting these in the build system + # actually causes a downgrade when using e.g. -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 + # (it'll downgrade to =2). So, this has no functional effect on + # the hardening for users. It's safe. + --disable-hardening + + # requires some python eclass + --disable-python + --enable-tmpfiles.d="${EPREFIX}"/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d + --enable-zlib=system + --with-editor="${EPREFIX}"/usr/libexec/editor + --with-env-editor + --with-plugindir="${EPREFIX}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/sudo + --with-rundir="${EPREFIX}"/run/sudo + --with-vardir="${EPREFIX}"/var/db/sudo + --without-linux-audit + --without-opie + $(use_enable gcrypt) + $(use_enable nls) + $(use_enable sasl) + $(use_enable ssl openssl) + $(use_with ldap) + $(use_with ldap ldap_conf_file /etc/ldap.conf.sudo) + $(use_with offensive insults) + $(use_with offensive all-insults) + $(use_with pam) + $(use_with pam pam-login) + $(use_with secure-path secure-path "${SECURE_PATH}") + $(use_with selinux) + $(use_with sendmail) + $(use_with skey) + $(use_with sssd) + ) + + econf "${myeconfargs[@]}" +} + +src_install() { + default + + if use ldap ; then + dodoc README.LDAP.md + + cat <<-EOF > "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo + # See ldap.conf(5) and README.LDAP.md for details + # This file should only be readable by root + + # supported directives: host, port, ssl, ldap_version + # uri, binddn, bindpw, sudoers_base, sudoers_debug + # tls_{checkpeer,cacertfile,cacertdir,randfile,ciphers,cert,key} + EOF + + if use sasl ; then + cat <<-EOF >> "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo + + # SASL directives: use_sasl, sasl_mech, sasl_auth_id + # sasl_secprops, rootuse_sasl, rootsasl_auth_id, krb5_ccname + EOF + fi + + insinto /etc + doins "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo + fperms 0440 /etc/ldap.conf.sudo + + insinto /etc/openldap/schema + newins docs/schema.OpenLDAP sudo.schema + fi + + if use pam ; then + pamd_mimic system-auth sudo auth account session + pamd_mimic system-auth sudo-i auth account session + fi + + keepdir /var/db/sudo/lectured + fperms 0700 /var/db/sudo/lectured + # bug #652958 + fperms 0711 /var/db/sudo + + # Don't install into /run as that is a tmpfs most of the time + # (bug #504854) + rm -rf "${ED}"/run || die + + # bug #697812 + find "${ED}" -type f -name "*.la" -delete || die +} + +pkg_postinst() { + tmpfiles_process sudo.conf + + # bug #652958 + local sudo_db="${EROOT}/var/db/sudo" + if [[ "$(stat -c %a "${sudo_db}")" -ne 711 ]] ; then + chmod 711 "${sudo_db}" || die + fi + + if use ldap ; then + ewarn + ewarn "sudo uses the ${ROOT}/etc/ldap.conf.sudo file for ldap configuration." + ewarn + if grep -qs '^[[:space:]]*sudoers:' "${ROOT}"/etc/nsswitch.conf ; then + ewarn "In 1.7 series, LDAP is no more consulted, unless explicitly" + ewarn "configured in ${ROOT}/etc/nsswitch.conf." + ewarn + ewarn "To make use of LDAP, add this line to your ${ROOT}/etc/nsswitch.conf:" + ewarn " sudoers: ldap files" + ewarn + fi + fi + if use prefix ; then + ewarn + ewarn "To use sudo on Prefix, you need to change file ownership and permissions" + ewarn "with root privileges, as follows:" + ewarn + ewarn " # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/usr/bin/sudo" + ewarn " # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/usr/lib/sudo/sudoers.so" + ewarn " # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/etc/sudoers" + ewarn " # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/etc/sudoers.d" + ewarn " # chown root:root ${EPREFIX}/var/db/sudo" + ewarn " # chmod 4111 ${EPREFIX}/usr/bin/sudo" + ewarn + fi + + elog "To use the -A (askpass) option, you need to install a compatible" + elog "password program from the following list. Starred packages will" + elog "automatically register for the use with sudo (but will not force" + elog "the -A option):" + elog "" + elog " [*] net-misc/ssh-askpass-fullscreen" + elog " net-misc/x11-ssh-askpass" + elog "" + elog "You can override the choice by setting the SUDO_ASKPASS environmnent" + elog "variable to the program you want to use." +} |