diff options
author | Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> | 2023-06-14 06:17:03 +0100 |
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committer | Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> | 2023-06-14 06:19:10 +0100 |
commit | 3db09f5bac6ff132b69d3f723d4c93662c96ed72 (patch) | |
tree | c5856fd39f18145f5f46a874f30d6b5a8d2270b2 /dev-libs/openssl/files | |
parent | dev-libs/xmlsec: add 1.3.1 (diff) | |
download | gentoo-3db09f5bac6ff132b69d3f723d4c93662c96ed72.tar.gz gentoo-3db09f5bac6ff132b69d3f723d4c93662c96ed72.tar.bz2 gentoo-3db09f5bac6ff132b69d3f723d4c93662c96ed72.zip |
dev-libs/openssl: drop 3.0.8-r4
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/903545
Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/907413
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files')
5 files changed, 0 insertions, 371 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3cf1d3b38ec9..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0464.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,214 +0,0 @@ -commit 959c59c7a0164117e7f8366466a32bb1f8d77ff1 -Author: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org> -Date: Wed Mar 8 15:28:20 2023 +1100 - - x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints - - A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions - of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains - that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this - vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers - exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service - (DoS) attack on affected systems. - - Fixes CVE-2023-0464 - - Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> - Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> - (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20568) - -diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h -index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h -+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h -@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st { - }; - - struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st { -+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */ -+ size_t node_count; -+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */ -+ size_t node_maximum; -+ - /* This is the tree 'level' data */ - X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels; - int nlevel; -@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk, - X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - X509_POLICY_DATA *data, - X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, -- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, -+ int extra_data); - void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node); - int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, - const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); -diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c -index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c -+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c -@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - X509_POLICY_DATA *data, - X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, -- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, -+ int extra_data) - { - X509_POLICY_NODE *node; - -+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */ -+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum) -+ return NULL; -+ - node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node)); - if (node == NULL) { - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - } - node->data = data; - node->parent = parent; -- if (level) { -+ if (level != NULL) { - if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { - if (level->anyPolicy) - goto node_error; -@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - } - } - -- if (tree) { -+ if (extra_data) { - if (tree->extra_data == NULL) - tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null(); - if (tree->extra_data == NULL){ -@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, - } - } - -+ tree->node_count++; - if (parent) - parent->nchild++; - -diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c -index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c -+++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c -@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@ - - #include "pcy_local.h" - -+/* -+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to -+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes. -+ * -+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the -+ * door on CVE-2023-0464. -+ */ -+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX -+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000 -+#endif -+ - static void expected_print(BIO *channel, - X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node, - int indent) -@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; - } - -+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */ -+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX; -+ - /* - * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. - * -@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL, - OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) - goto bad_tree; -- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { -+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) { - ossl_policy_data_free(data); - goto bad_tree; - } -@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise - */ - static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, -- X509_POLICY_DATA *data) -+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data, -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) - { - X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; - int i, matched = 0; -@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); - - if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { -- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) -+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL) - return 0; - matched = 1; - } - } - if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { -- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) -+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) - return 0; - } - return 1; -@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. - */ - static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, -- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) -+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) - { - int i; - -@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); - - /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ -- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) -+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree)) - return 0; - } - return 1; -@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ - data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; - data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; -- if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { -+ if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) { - ossl_policy_data_free(data); - return 0; - } -@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, - /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ - if (last->anyPolicy && - ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, -- last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) -+ last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) - return 0; - return 1; - } -@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, - extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS - | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; - node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, -- tree); -+ tree, 1); - } - if (!tree->user_policies) { - tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); -@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) - - for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { - cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert); -- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) -+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree)) - return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; - - if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 852706d8aa92..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0465.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,46 +0,0 @@ -commit 1dd43e0709fece299b15208f36cc7c76209ba0bb -Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Date: Tue Mar 7 16:52:55 2023 +0000 - - Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf certs - - Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we - later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf - cert was bad. - - Fixes: CVE-2023-0465 - - Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> - Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> - (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20587) - -diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644 ---- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) - goto memerr; - /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ - if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { -- int i; -+ int i, cbcalled = 0; - - /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ -- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { -+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { - X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); - -+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0) -+ cbcalled = 1; - CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); - } -+ if (!cbcalled) { -+ /* Should not be able to get here */ -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ - return 1; - } - if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c71665d82e18..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-0466.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -commit 51e8a84ce742db0f6c70510d0159dad8f7825908 -Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -Date: Tue Mar 21 16:15:47 2023 +0100 - - Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() - - The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking. - - Fixes: CVE-2023-0466 - - Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> - Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> - (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20563) - -diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod -index 75a1677022..43c1900bca 100644 ---- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod -+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod -@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B<trust>. - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to - B<t>. Normally the current time is used. - --X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled --by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set. -+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set. -+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable -+policy checking. - - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled - by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing -@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i. - The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(), - and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0. - -+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as -+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this. -+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation. -+ - =head1 COPYRIGHT - - Copyright 2009-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9b1a657d51be..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-CVE-2023-1255.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -commit 02ac9c9420275868472f33b01def01218742b8bb -Author: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -Date: Mon Apr 17 16:51:20 2023 +0200 - - aesv8-armx.pl: Avoid buffer overrread in AES-XTS decryption - - Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon) - Fixes: CVE-2023-1255 - - The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes. - Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless. - - Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> - Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> - (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759) - - (cherry picked from commit 72dfe46550ee1f1bbfacd49f071419365bc23304) - -diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl -index 6a7bf05d1b..bd583e2c89 100755 ---- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl -+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl -@@ -3353,7 +3353,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); - .align 4 - .Lxts_dec_tail4x: - add $inp,$inp,#16 -- vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16 -+ tst $tailcnt,#0xf - veor $tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0 - vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16 - veor $tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2 -@@ -3362,6 +3362,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/); - veor $tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4 - vst1.8 {$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32 - -+ b.eq .Lxts_dec_abort -+ vld1.32 {$dat0},[$inp],#16 - b .Lxts_done - .align 4 - .Lxts_outer_dec_tail: diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 111681f27d07..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-3.0.8-mips-cflags.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ -https://bugs.gentoo.org/894140 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214 - -From d500b51791cd56e73065e3a7f4487fc33f31c91c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org> -Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2023 17:56:58 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix Configure test for -mips in CFLAGS - -We want to add -mips2 or -mips3 only if the user hasn't already -specified a mips version in CFLAGS. The existing test was a -double-negative. - -Fixes: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20214 ---- - Configure | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Configure b/Configure -index b6bbec0a85c4..ec48614d6b99 100755 ---- a/Configure -+++ b/Configure -@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m) - } - - if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm} -- && !grep { $_ !~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { -+ && !grep { $_ =~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { - # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules - my $value; - $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/); |